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Abstract 
I examine the effect of insider ownership on the level of cash holding by measuring the percentage of 
shares issued to the public, namely public float. Using a sample of 4,402 IPOs between 1990 and 
2013, I find that public float has significantly negative relation with the level of firm’s cash holdings. 
Specifically, the reduced insider ownership by large percentage of shares issued to the public seems to 
motivate insiders to waste more cash, resulting in decrease in the level of cash holding. This relation 
persists even after controlling for various firm characteristics. High public float (or small insider 
ownership) also exacerbate agency problem evidenced by public float being positively associated with 
discretionary accrual proxy for agency problem. The level of cash holding reduced further when we 
interact public float with discretionary accrual term. Collectively, this finding suggests that large sales 
in insider ownership in IPO market worsen the agency problem and consequently motivate insider to 
squander firm’s cash holding. 
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I. Introduction 
While IPOs have been researched widely through time, the implications of public float have 
received little attention in the literature. One of the most notable researches about public float was 
done in consideration with underpricing. More specifically, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Bradley 
and Jordan (2002) argue that underpricing is highly likely to depend on how much insiders sell their 
shares at the IPO. The more shares they sell, the greater incentive they put to reduce underpricing. 
Another paper related to public float is about long-term performance written by Michel et al. (2014). 
They find a U-shaped relation between the number of published shares and post-IPO returns. In 
particular, long-run returns will decrease as public float increases, but this relation only happens for 
low levels of public float. As firm publishes high levels of float, long-term performance will improve 
in positive relation with public float. They explain this relation based on a trade-off between insiders’ 
incentive and monitoring of outside shareholders. 
In this paper, I examine the potential effect of public float on cash holdings caused by separation 
of ownership and control. When firm publishes more shares, the ownership of outside shareholders 
will increase, but the ownership of insiders will decrease accordingly. This decrease in insiders’ 
ownership may cause negligence and profusion in the management of such firm (Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)). To examine that effect, I focus on researching a specific aspect: firm cash holdings because 
of three following reasons. First, managerial insiders can easily access to cash reserves with little 
scrutiny and use it by their discretion (Amy Dittmar and Jan Mahrt-Smith (2007)). Second, IPO firms 
usually hold substantial amount of cash and do not face financial constrains after IPO, so cash 
becomes highly attractive for insiders to extract. Lastly, firm-level governance itself is usually 
changing slowly. Therefore, IPO provides a good test ground to observe a significant change in firm’s 
governance and its impact on firm-level cash holdings after IPO.  
In particular, I am interested in clarifying the following three questions. (i) Does higher public 
float lead insiders to deplete cash reserves?, (ii) Does the level of public float truly affect corporate 
governance through the segregation between ownership and control after IPO?, and (iii) How does 
public float in correlation with corporate governance affect firm cash holdings? These hypotheses are 
developed based on the logic that firms with higher public float will have weaker corporate 
governance (hypothesis (ii)). Furthermore, firms with weaker governance structures truly hold smaller 
amount of cash (Hardford et al. (2008)). Instead of increasing cash dividends to shareholders, firms 
with weaker governance will repurchase to avoid future payout commitments. These firms also use 
cash quickly in capital expenditure and acquisitions, rather than stockpile it (Amy Dittmar and Jan 
Mahrt-Smith (2007)). Therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that insiders in firm with higher 
public float tends to deplete and remain cash at a lower level. 
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I define the public float as the percentage of shares held by the public immediately after IPO (both 
individuals and institutions). To determine the level of cash holdings in IPO firms, I follow J. Harford 
et al. (2008) to use three different measures. They are ratio of cash to sale, ratio of cash to net assets, 
and industrial-adjusted cash to sale ratio. In all three regression models, I use cash holdings as 
dependent variable and public float as key explanatory variable. Using a sample of 4,402 IPO firms 
with total 15,719 firm-year observations from IPO year to third fiscal year after IPO, I find that public 
float is highly significantly negative related to cash holdings. Every 1% increase in public float will 
cause approximately 2.2% decrease in firm cash holding. This result holds for all three regression 
models. 
 With purpose of examining whether the effect of public float on firm cash holdings is associated 
with corporate governance, I investigate the corporate governance in low and high public float firms. 
Following Yael V. Hochberg (2012), I employ discretional current accrual as proxy for corporate 
governance in newly public firms. I find that IPO firms with high public float actually have weaker 
corporate governance. With 1% increase in public float, insiders will manage earnings upward about 
3.36% (or 4% after controlling for effects). 
 To confirm the effect of public float on firm cash holdings in association with corporate 
governance, I run another regression model in which includes both public float and discretional 
current accruals together with an interaction term between these two variables as independent variable.  
Results show that coefficient of the interaction term is negative, meaning that an increase in 
discretional current accruals causes higher decrease in firm cash holdings for large public float. 
However, the coefficient is not statistically significant. I suppose that there exists an endogenous 
effect between discretional current accruals and firm cash holdings which effects significance of the 
coefficient of the interaction term. Further tests are suggested to clarify this issue. 
This paper contributes to literature by pointing out a new implication of public float which is 
researched in relation with firm cash holdings.  Particularly, high public float may predict low firm 
cash reserves after IPO due to decreased incentive of insiders caused from reduce of their ownership. 
My paper is also of significance in examining level of corporate governance in newly public firms. 
The result is notable that firms with high public float tend to have weaker corporate governance with 
symptom of upward management in earnings. However, the effect of public float on cash holdings in 
association with corporate governance remains hard to confirm and requires further examinations. 
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 is review of related literature. 
Section 3 is hypotheses development and methodology. In section 4, I will describe my data 
and descriptive statistics. Section 5 shows the empirical results, and section 6 concludes. 
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II. Literature 
There is a body of literature devoted to studying factors that may affect level of cash holdings. T. 
Opler et al. (1999) show that firms with strong growth opportunities, riskier activities or small 
capitalization hold more cash than other firms. Moreover, large firms and those firms with good credit 
ratings tend to hold less cash due to their greatest access to the capital market. These results are 
consistent with the view that firms hold more cash to ensure enough capital for investment in case 
cash flow is too low relative to investment, and cost of outside financing is very high. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) also points out that firms have incentive to hold more cash as raising external finance is 
more costly due to asymmetric information between firms and outside investors. The optimal amount 
of liquidity is determined according to Kim et al. (1998) by a tradeoff between the benefit of reducing 
costly external finance to a lowest level and the low income of internal liquidity assets. They also 
indicate that US firms decide optimal level of investment in cash based on the cost of external 
financing, the uncertainty of future cash flows, and the perspective of investment opportunities in the 
future.  Considering impacts on cash balance from outside institutes, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) 
documents that determining cash level of firms in United States, Germany, and Japan is also impacted 
substantially by the monopoly power of banks.  
However, in many other cases, level of corporate cash holdings is not determined to meet 
investment need or in the other word to maximize shareholder’s wealth. Instead of that, cash is spent 
based on discretion of managers to serve their own purpose.  J. Harford et al. (2008) indicates that 
firms with weaker corporate governance reserve less cash then those with stronger governance. 
Instead of distributing cash dividend to shareholder, firm with weaker governance structures will 
repurchase to avoid future payout commitments. These firms also spend cash quickly on capital 
expenditures and acquisitions. Agency problem also causes inefficient use of cash when managers 
implement underinvestment and asset substitution (Myers (1977); Jensen and Meckling (1976)). 
Managers can use cash to serve their own interests at the expense of shareholders. 
The relationship between corporate structure and cash holdings is also examined directly by V. 
Subramaniam et al. (2011). They examine whether cash holdings is affected by firm’s organizational 
structure (i.e., whether a firm is focused or diversified) and find that firms with diversified structure 
hold significantly less cash than their matched focused ones. The lower cash holdings among 
diversified firms is explained by supplemental growth opportunities across various segments of those 
firms and the activeness of internal capital market within diversified firms. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) 
also contend that ownership structure of firms affects significantly cash holdings in their UK samples. 
They find that cash holdings is non-linearly related to managerial ownership in form of cubic equation. 
Particularly, cash holdings will fall as management ownership increases up to 24%, and then rise until  
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managerial ownership inclines up to 64%, and decline after that.    
III. Hypothesis development 
3.1. Hypotheses development 
I test the following three hypotheses. My first hypothesis argues how public float may be 
associated with cash holdings. My second hypothesis tests whether the increase in public float is 
positive related to weak corporate governance in firm after IPO, and my third hypothesis examines 
how public float with differing corporate governance may be associated with cash holdings. 
Before a firm goes public, there is no shares hold by the public. Total shares in the firm at that time 
belong to the ownership of its insiders. Therefore, the insiders have strongest incentive to devote 
themselves to improve firm’s performance as well as to benefit themselves. However, after IPO, 
insiders have to share their ownership with outside shareholders. The more shares a firm issues, the 
less ownership insiders come to hold. This appearance of outside shareholders and decrease of 
insiders’ ownership introduce an agency problem in new public firms. Insiders will have less 
incentive work as hard as they can because total profits now will not benefit only them. Rather than 
that, insiders will implement empire building and waste firm’s resources to benefit themselves at costs 
shared by outside shareholder (A. Michel et al. (2014)).  
Simultaneously, cash appears as the most attractive source for insiders to serve their own interest. 
According to Michel et al. (2014), most of firms (59%) in his IPO sample from 1996 to 2006 
issued about 20-40% of its total shares; 24% of firms published less than 20% float. However, in 
many cases, firms need to issue much more shares than these ranges. For example, when firm needs 
significant funds to feed its good investment opportunities, but it cannot borrow in creditable manners 
due to its small firm size and low reputation before public. Because public float is positive related to 
IPO proceeds, the amount of cash gained during the public will increase as firm issues more shares. 
Moreover, the proceeds in short term will make firm cash reserves increased because firm needs a 
certain time to allocate this amount of proceeds to specific purposes mentioned in their filings. As a 
result, cash easily becomes inviting for private purposes of insiders, especially when their ownership 
decreased significantly through IPO. According to J. Harford et al. (2008), cash reserves in firms with 
agency problem are less than in firms with stronger governance. Insiders in weak governance firms 
tend to use cash quickly on capital expenditure and acquisitions. They also prefer repurchasing to 
distributing cash dividend to shareholder to avoid future payout commitments with outside 
shareholders. Agency problem also causes inefficient use of cash when managers implement 
underinvestment and asset substitution (Myers (1977), Jensen and Meckling (1976)).  
Therefore, I test hypothesis 1: Whether the increase in public float leads IPO firm to hold less cash  
than firm with lower public float. 
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On the other hand, it could be argued that at high level of public float, agency problem will 
become negative related to increase of the float due to increased efficiency in monitor of outside 
shareholders. Holding a large amount of float enables outside shareholders easier to observe firm’s 
activities and establish policies to prevent waste actions of insiders. Therefore, cash reserves in high 
public float firms may not be affected by weakness in corporate governance after IPO. However, this 
argument is disputable if most of outside shareholders are individual investors, not financial 
institution. If so, it is even harder for those separate investors to scrutinize firm’s policies which were 
established and enhanced by insiders from foundation date of the firm.  
In order to clarify whether and how public float affects corporate governance, I test hypothesis 2: 
Increase in public float is positive related to weak corporate governance in firm after IPO. 
 Furthermore, I also test hypothesis 3 to confirm whether the effect of public float on firm cash 
holdings is associated with corporate governance or not. 
3.2. Regression specification 
Hypothesis 1: Whether the increase in public float in accordance with weaker corporate 
governance leads IPO firm to hold less cash than firm with lower public float 
To test this hypothesis, I use a regression model in which public float is main independent variable, 
and cash holdings is dependent value. Other variables is included and calculated according to J. 
Harford et al (2008).  
Following the literature to research long-term performance of IPO stocks, I measure all of the 
variables except for public float by using yearly data within 3 years after IPOs (from the end of IPO 
fiscal year to third fiscal year after IPO). I choose a period of 3 years because of an argument that cash 
holdings is affected strongest by insiders only within 3 years after IPO as level of firm cash holdings 
is relatively high. After this 3-year period, cash reserves may not be as high as before due to cash 
from IPO proceeds was allocated partial to specific areas. At that time, level of cash holdings is highly 
likely to be affected by firm’s cash policy rather than insider’s discretion. I use cash holdings variable 
which is calculated every year because cash can be influenced by insiders at any year after IPO.  
The regression model is: 
 
Cash holdingsi,t =  β0  +  β1 x Public Floati  +  β2 x Sizei,t  +  β3 x Leveragei,t  +  β4 x Market-
to-Booki,t  +  β5 x Cash Flow/Assetsi,t  +  β6 x Working Capital/Assetsi,t  +  β7 x R&D/Salesi,t  
+  β8 x CapEx/Assetsi,t  +  β9 x Acquisition/Salesi,t  +  β10 x Dividend Indicatori,t  +  β11 x Bond 
Indicatori,t  +  i,t, (1) 
where Cash holdingsi,t is cash holding for firm i at the end of fiscal year t (t from 0 to 3). Public 
Floati is public float of firm i immediately after IPO. Other control variables, signed as Xi,t, 
stand for value of firm i  at the end of fiscal year I after IPO.  
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Hypothesis 2: Public float is positively related to corporate governance through the separation of 
ownership and control after IPO. 
To test this relationship between public float and corporate governance, I follow Yael V.Hochberg 
(2012) to use Discretional Current Accruals as proxy for symptom of weak corporate governance. In 
his paper, Yael V.Hochberg examines the effects of venture capital backing on firm’s corporate 
governance after IPO. He finds that venture-backed firms have stronger corporate structure presented 
by a lower level of earnings management than their counterpart not backed by venture before IPO. 
This effect results from the monitoring function of the venturer. BiaoXie et al. (2003) also indicate 
that firms with more independent outside directors seating on the board are less likely to manage 
earnings. Based on this setting, it could be hypothesize that discretional current accruals are likely to 
be managed upward in firms with weaker corporate governance.  
Similar to cash holdings, discretional current accruals and control variables are computed annually 
within 3 years after IPO. The model is as follow: 
 
Discretional Current Accrualsi,t  =  β0  +  β1 x Public Floati  +  β2 x SIZE_1i,t  +  β3 x ROE_1i,t  +  β4 
x GROWTH_1i,t  +  β5 x LEV_1i,t  +  i,t (2) 
 
Hypothesis 3: Public float with differing corporate governance affects corporate cash holdings. 
The regression model is specified as following: 
 
Cash holdingsi,t =  β0  +  β1 x Public Floati  +  β2 x Discretional Current Accrualsi,t  +  β3 x 
Public Floati x Discretional Current Accrualsi,t  +  β x Control variablesi,t  +  i,t, (3) 
 
in which control variables are those included in model (1). 
β3 is expected to have negative coefficient so that an increase in discretional current accruals 
causes higher decrease in firm cash holdings for large public float.  
IV. Data description 
4.1. Cash holdings 
The primary ratio that I use as proxy for cash holdings is ratio of cash to sales, measured as log of 
cash and cash equivalents to total sales. I use this ratio as main ratio of cash holdings because one of 
the important reasons for firms to go public is raising money for their future investment activities. 
Therefore, for my analysis, I treat cash as a liquid investment used to meet the working capital needs 
of the firm, which is highly related to its sales. Working capital as a percentage of sales can tell a 
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business how much of every sales dollar must be re-used to meet operational expenses and short-term 
debt obligations in the working capital cycle. Sufficient working capital replies on sales revenues, 
business segment, inventory level, or business cycle. Therefore, cash plays a vital role in supporting 
working capital for firms to expand their business, meet short-term business targets and finance 
business expenses. 
However, due to specific business characteristics of every single firm, cash to sale ratio could be 
useful to measure cash holdings for this firm, but not proper for the other firms. Therefore, I use two 
additional measures of cash holdings. First method is to use ratio of cash and marketable securities to 
net assets. Net assets is calculated as total assets minus cash and marketable securities, similar to 
Opler et al. (1999).  I follow J. Harford et al. (2008) to generate the second method so-called industry-
adjusted cash to sales ratio because industry classification is considered as a significant determinant of 
cash holdings. This method will reduce the effect of disparity in cash among different industries. I 
compute this ratio by two steps. First, I compute the median industry levels of the ratio of cash to 
sales within the Fama and French 48 industry categories. After that, the industry-adjusted cash to sales 
ratio is computed by taking the firm’s variable minus the median industry level of the cash to sales 
ratio. Using these two later methods, I find similar results as those estimated by using ratio of cash to 
sales. 
4.2. Public float 
The public float is defined as the fraction of post-IPO shares held by the public (both individuals 
and institutions) immediately after IPO. Thus, the higher the public float is, the less shares held by 
insiders. 
4.3. Corporate governance 
 In order to examine whether the relation between cash holdings and public float results from 
corporate governance issues, I conduct measure of corporate governance to test its relationship with 
public float. This issue would ideally be addressed by applying famous G-index described by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), and by using comprehensive governance database provided by 
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). However, the IRRC only offers the annual lists 
of the largest corporations, and data of those companies in list of Standard & Poor’s 500. Because of 
lack in comprehensive public database to measure corporate governance of newly published firms, I 
follow a method of Yael V. Hochberg (2012).  
 They use discretional current accruals to examine a potential of weak governance structure at the 
firm level. Firms with weak corporate governance are highly likely to manage earnings more 
aggressively, while good governed firms are less likely to manage earnings. The method to calculate 
discretional current accruals is shown in Appendix 1. 
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4.4. The sample 
To assemble my data set of IPOs between 1990 and 2013, I combine data from several sources. 
The initial number of IPOs is 8,613 during this period from SDC. Following prior IPO literature, I 
exclude all financial firms and utility firms (SIC codes between 6000 to 6999, and between 4900 and 
4999, respectively), Closed-end Fund/Trust, Limit Partnership, Unit offerings since the institutional 
structure and payout policy decisions of these samples are likely to be fundamentally different from 
that of a typical IPO firms. I also delete small offerings with IPO proceeds less than $10 million or 
with offer price less than $5. These securities are subject to Regulation A, less stringent disclosure 
requirements. IPOs without either offer price or offer amount is also excluded from my sample, which 
leaves me 4,923 IPO firms from SDC database. 
In order to calculate Public float, the SDC data, then, are matched with CRSP daily stock database 
to find the number of share outstanding immediately after IPO. I require IPO firms to be listed on 
CRSP immediately or at most 1 day after offering. I eliminate IPOs which do not offer ordinary 
common shares (share code in CRSP different from 10, 11 and 12). I delete 203 firms missing data in 
CRSP. 
Finally, to calculate the main dependent variable and control variables, I obtain information for the 
analysis from the Annual Compustat database from three years after firms’ IPO. Control variables are 
calculated by following Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2012) and described clearly in Appendix 2. I 
don’t include standard deviation of cash flows for the past ten years (CF Volatility) in my sample due 
to lack of firm’s data before IPO.  I eliminated 325 firms because of missing Compustat data.  
The final sample includes 4,395 IPO firms, and 15,672 firm-year observations. 
I winsorize my dependent variable Cash Holdings, key independent variable Public float and firm 
specific factors including Leverage, Market-to-Book, CF/Assets, Working Capital/Assets, R&D/Sales, 
CapEx/Assets, and Acquisition/Sales at the 1% level on either tail using full sample, to reduce the 
impact of outliers and data coding errors. Winsorizing has no qualitative effect on any of my results.  
4.5. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics including the mean, median, standard deviation, and 25th and 
75th percentiles. My dependent variable, ratio of cash to sales, has a mean of 181% and median of 
14.89% with a standard deviation of nearly 970%. This large difference between mean and median 
indicates that most of firms in the sample hold small amount of cash within 3 years after IPO, but 
there are a small number of firms which hold very large amount of cash compared to their sales. 
Because of its skewness, I use the log of cash holdings for regression. The post-IPO public float 
averaged 33.79%, with a median of 29.02% and a standard deviation of 19.58%, meaning that an  
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Table I: Descriptive statistics for the 1990-2013 Sample 
This table provides summary statistics for the sample. The data set comprises 15,672 firm-year observations 
from 4,395 firms covering the period from 1990 to 2013. The descriptive statistics include: ratio of cash to sales 
(Cash/Sale), log of cash to sales ratio (Log_Cash/Sale), ratio of cash to total assets (Cash/TA), log of cash to 
total assets ratio (Log_Cash/TA), industry adjusted ratio of cash to sales (Cash/Sale_adj), public float (PF), 
Sales, Assets, firm Leverage, ratio of the market value to book value of assets (Market-to-Book), ratio of cash 
flow to net assets (Cash Flow/Assets), ratio of net working capital to net assets (Working Capital/Assets), ratio 
of research and development to sales (R&D/Sales), ratio of capital expenditures to net assets (CapEx/Assets), 
and ratio of acquisition to sales (Acquisition/Sales). Net assets equal total assets minus cash holdings. The 
variables Cash Holdings, Leverage, Market-to-Book, CF/Assets, Working Capital/Assets, R&D/Sales, 
CapEx/Assets, Acquisition/Sales are winsorized at the 1% level on either tail. 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
Cash/Sale 0.3379 0.2902 0.1958 0.2174 0.3882 
Log_Cash/Sale 1.8119 0.1489 9.6986 0.0327 0.5270 
Cash/AT -1.9848 -1.8800 2.2053 -3.3581 -0.6272 
Log_Cash/AT 0.5697 0.1485 1.6383 0.0348 0.4359 
Cash/Sale_adj -2.0951 -1.8867 1.9201 -3.3076 -0.8190 
Log_Cash/Sale_adj 1.6771 0.0484 9.6475 -0.0189 0.3643 
PF (Public float) -1.4354 -1.4637 2.0925 -2.7146 -0.2347 
Sales ($ millions) 464.6022 92.6200 2887.9200 30.4610 277.9180 
Assets ($ millions) 541.6836 115.0750 3118.1100 49.9330 313.2310 
Leverage 0.2270 0.1043 0.3067 0.0031 0.3634 
Market-to-Book 2.8361 1.9618 2.7822 1.2903 3.2952 
Cash Flow/Assets -0.3312 0.0130 1.2559 -0.2601 0.0810 
Working Capital/Assets 1.0392 0.7145 1.6229 0.3782 1.1016 
R&D/Sales 1.0254 0.0148 5.7956 0.0000 0.1952 
CapEx/Assets 0.0952 0.0593 0.1066 0.0290 0.1186 
Acquisition/Sales 0.0626 0.0000 0.2201 0.0000 0.0228 
 
average firm has nearly 34% of its total shares outstanding after IPO held by the public (both primary 
and secondary offerings). Other variables are reported yearly at the end of firms’ fiscal year. An 
average firm in the sample has sale of about $0.47 billion, lower than total assets of about $0.54 
billion, leverage ratio averages of 22.7%, market to book value of about 2.84, cash flows to assets of 
about -0.32%, capital expenditures to assets of about 9.5%, and acquisition to assets of about 6.25%. 
  
10 
 
Table II: Frequency and mean of cash holdings and asset levels by industry from 1990 to 2013 
The sample consists of 4394 IPO firms from 1990 to 2013. Industries are defined as the Fama and French 48 
industries. This table shows means of cash holdings, sales, and assets of groups of IPO firms divided by 
industry though the whole period from 1990 to 2013. Ratio of cash to sale, ratio of cash to assets, and 
industries-adjusted cash to sale ratio are used to proxy for cash holdings. Sales and assets are reported in 
millions. Only 10 firms at the top and 10 firms at the bottom sorted by cash/sale are shown below. 
 
By industry Fre-
quency 
Percent Cash/ 
Sale 
Sales 
(Net) 
Cash/ 
Assets 
Assets Cash/ 
Sale_Adj 
Top 10 firms with largest cash to sale ratio 
Pharmaceutical Products 379 8.64 9.78 56.93 1.75 156.79 9.22 
Trading 31 0.71 3.92 154.19 0.82 414.74 3.80 
Medical Equipment 201 4.58 3.84 73.44 0.83 99.18 3.70 
Precious Metals 4 0.09 3.52 83.72 1.22 322.01 3.25 
Communication 205 4.67 3.14 372.01 0.41 1301.77 3.05 
Measuring and Control 
Equipment 
86 1.96 2.20 193.95 0.56 219.11 2.10 
Agriculture 12 0.27 1.89 1291.74 0.15 1590.25 1.84 
Electrical Equipment 39 0.89 1.64 359.03 0.75 515.85 1.58 
Entertainment 73 1.66 1.50 434.89 0.17 980.61 1.41 
Business Services 1112 25.35 1.34 217.83 0.70 356.95 1.19 
Chemicals 42 0.96 1.20 1067.06 0.22 1112.83 1.15 
 
Bottom 10 firms with smallest cash to sale ratio 
Automobiles and Trucks 44 1 0.09 5802.25 0.13 5366.54 0.06 
Tobacco Products 4 0.09 0.09 1109.65 0.05 1135.95 0.06 
Consumer Goods 52 1.19 0.08 416.77 0.21 374.90 0.05 
Utilities 2 0.05 0.07 603.24 0.04 1219.75 0.06 
Apparel 54 1.23 0.07 382.15 0.18 253.41 0.04 
Shipping Containers 14 0.32 0.06 709.71 0.11 713.88 0.04 
Business Supplies 20 0.46 0.04 962.08 0.05 762.53 0.02 
Fabricated Products 8 0.18 0.03 293.57 0.03 285.13 -0.01 
Textiles 18 0.41 0.02 439.65 0.04 388.11 0.01 
Candy & Soda 4 0.09 0.02 3114.97 0.02 3113.28 -0.02 
 
Table II shows the frequency of IPO firms from 1990 to 2013 by industry. I use the Fama and 
French 48 industries for industry classification. As shown in the table, 25.35% of IPO firms (1,112 
firms) are in business services, followed by 8.64% of pharmaceutical products industry, 6.88% of 
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electronic equipment industry, 6.61% of retail industry, and 6.06% of computer industry. The 
industries with the highest levels of cash holdings (in term of both cash to sale ratio and cash to asset 
ratio) during my thirteen years of sample period are pharmaceutical products, medical equipment, 
precious metals, trading, and communication in term of cash per sale or electronic equipment in term 
of cash per assets. These firms hold very high level of cash holdings compared to the average level of 
181%. For example, an average firm in pharmaceutical products industry has 978% of cash to sales 
and 1.75% of cash to total assets.  The high level of cash holdings in these industries may result from 
the fact that these are most profitable industries in the market. However, industries with the highest 
level of assets and sales are automobiles and trucks, candy & soda, food products, coal, and 
agriculture. 
To see whether there is a significant difference between firm cash holdings before and after IPO, I 
report the means of cash holdings for every single year before and after IPO in panel A of table III. 
Due to the limitation of data before IPO, I report cash holdings only up to 2 years prior to their IPO, 
and to 3 years after IPO. All measures of cash holdings are winzorised at 1% each tail before taking 
means to prevent the effect of some abnormal firms with very high cash reserves. Panel A shows that 
firms hold a significant amount of cash both before and after IPO with high t-statistics. A average 
firm holds cash at nearly 2.91 times to its sale prior to going public 2 years. However, this ratio 
reduces substantially to 1 year prior to IPO at just around 175% of cash to sales. Interestingly, cash 
holdings in offering year get back to as high as it is in second year before IPO at around 2.93. 
Nevertheless, it reduces gradually in 3 years after that. This pattern holds for two other proxies of cash 
holdings. The statistical differences of firm cash holdings before and after IPO are shown in Panel B. 
In particular, the difference of average cash to sale ratio in 2 years after and before IPO is 0.62. 
Similarly, they are 0.25 of increase for cash to total assets ratio, and 0.64 of increase for industry 
adjusted cash to sale ratio. 
Table IV reports the distribution of the sample by public float ranges (columns) and by year (rows) 
from 1990 to 2013. One thing to note is that the distribution is uneven. The number of IPOs peaks at 
the range 20–40% and then decreases. This pattern holds across all years in the sample. About 56.7% 
of the IPOs fall in the 20–40% range of public float. The number of IPOs is significantly high before 
2000 with average of 1091 firms going public every year, but this number decreases significantly of 
nearly 75% to 290 IPOs per year from 2001.  
Another remarkable point in this table is that public float reduces significantly in the 1999 – 2000 
period. Only about 40% of firms issue shares in float range of 20-40%, much lower than the average 
percentage of firms issue in this float range for the whole period of 15 years (approximately 57%).  
The number of firms going public with float higher than 40% also decreases to less than 10% in 2000. 
However, the number of firms publishes float less than 20% increase surprisingly from 22% in 1998   
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Table III: Cash holdings sorted by years before and after IPO 
The sample consists of 4394 IPO firms from 1990 to 2013. The sample is sorted by time order from 2 years before to 3 years after IPO. There are 3,114 firms having data 
of cash holdings prior IPO 2 years, 4,394 firms have data in year of IPO, and 3368 firms having data up to 3 years after IPO. Panel A reports means and t values for 3 
proxies of cash holdings for 6 continuous years. Panel B report the differences of cash holdings before and after IPO for many time intervals together with their t-tests. 
 
Panel A: Means of cash holdings by time order 
  CashSale CashAT Cashsale_adj 
 Obs Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
2 years prior to IPO 3114 2.9066 8.89 0.9414 16.44 2.7709 8.51 
1 year prior to IPO 4315 1.7506 10.90 0.6056 22.84 1.6375 10.24 
IPO year 4394 2.9343 14.49 0.9117 26.72 2.8083 13.92 
1 year after IPO 4149 1.6456 11.37 0.4703 21.50 1.5126 10.51 
2 year after IPO 3761 1.3260 9.75 0.4533 18.49 1.1886 8.79 
3 year after IPO 3368 1.3243 8.61 0.4063 17.86 1.1799 7.72 
 
Panel B: Differences of cash holdings before and after IPO 
  CashSale Cash AT Cashsale_adj 
  Diff(1-2) t-value Diff(1-2) t-value Diff(1-2) t-value 
diff year -2 vs 2  1.5806 4.46 0.4881 7.83 1.5823 4.49 
diff year -1 vs 1  0.1049 0.49 0.1353 3.93 0.1249 0.58 
diff year -1 vs 0  -1.1837 -4.54 -0.3061 -7.05 -1.1708 -4.51 
diff year 0 vs 1  1.2886 5.13 0.4414 10.75 1.2958 5.19 
diff year [-2,-1] vs [1,2] 0.6213 3.44 0.2516 8.23 0.6363 3.53 
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Table IV: Number of IPOs by public float and by year 
The table reports the distribution of the sample from 1990 to 2013 by public float ranges (columns) and by year 
(rows). The sample of IPOs is sorted into five groups by public float percentage in 20% ranges. Each column in 
the panel represents a different range of public float in ascending order. The first five columns report the 
number of IPOs in each of the years 1990–2013, respectively. The last column reports the yearly totals over all 
public float ranges. The last row reports total number of IPOs from 1990 to 2013 by ranges. 
 
 PF0020 PF2040 PF4060 PF6080 PF8010 Total 
1990 9 (11.8%) 48 (63.2%) 13 (17.1%) 3 (3.9%) 3 (3.9%) 76 
1991 17 (7.9%) 147 (68.4%) 37 (17.2%) 8 (3.7%) 6 (2.8%) 215 
1992 18 (6.5%) 182 (65.5%) 58 (20.9%) 7 (2.5%) 13 (4.7%) 278 
1993 37 (9.6%) 225 (58.1%) 90 (23.3%) 13 (3.4%) 22 (5.7%) 387 
1994 33 (11.6%) 167 (58.6%) 55 (19.3%) 10 (3.5%) 20 (7.0%) 285 
1995 43 (12.6%) 216 (63.2%) 59 (17.3%) 8 (2.3%) 16 (4.7%) 342 
1996 81 (15.6%) 296 (57.1%) 85 (16.4%) 18 (3.5%) 38 (7.3%) 518 
1997 43 (12.5%) 209 (60.8%) 67 (19.5%) 10 (2.9%) 15 (4.4%) 344 
1998 46 (22.0%) 114 (54.5%) 28 (13.4%) 4 (1.9%) 17 (8.1%) 209 
1999 186 (46.0%) 173 (42.8%) 15 (3.7%) 6 (1.5%) 24 (5.9%) 404 
2000 157 (50.0%) 129 (41.1%) 16 (5.1%) 2 (0.6%) 10 (3.2%) 314 
2001 16 (27.6%) 30 (51.7%) 8 (13.8%) 2 (3.4%) 2 (3.4%) 58 
2002 6 (12.0%) 28 (56.0%) 7 (14.0%) 5 (10.0%) 4 (8.0%) 50 
2003 8 (17.0%) 26 (55.3%) 7 (14.9%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (12.8%) 47 
2004 23 (17.3%) 87 (65.4%) 18 (13.5%) 1 (0.8%) 4 (3.0%) 133 
2005 10 (8.7%) 65 (56.5%) 26 (22.6%) 4 (3.5%) 10 (8.7%) 115 
2006 16 (14.3%) 78 (69.6%) 15 (13.4%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (2.7%) 112 
2007 31 (25.6%) 77 (63.6%) 10 (8.3%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (2.5%) 121 
2008 2 (14.3%) 8 (57.1%) 3 (21.4%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (7.1%) 14 
2009 10 (27.0%) 18 (48.6%) 6 (16.2%) 1 (2.7%) 2 (5.4%) 37 
2010 17 (25.4%) 35 (52.2%) 11 (16.4%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (6.0%) 67 
2011 27 (39.1%) 35 (50.7%) 4 (5.8%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (4.3%) 69 
2012 28 (34.1%) 37 (45.1%) 7 (8.5%) 1 (1.2%) 9 (11.0%) 82 
2013 29 (24.8%) 66 (56.4%) 8 (6.8%) 2 (1.7%) 12 (10.3%) 117 
Total 893 (20.3%) 2496 (56.8%) 653 (14.9%) 105 (2.4%) 247 (5.6%) 4394 
 
to 46% in 1999. Consistent with prior IPO literature, firms go public much more often in the bubble 
period of 1999-2000 with low public float. This special phenomenon is attributed to high market 
valuation as firms can issue smaller number of shares than one they planned, but still raise sufficient 
desirable proceeds (Loungran and Ritter (2002); Dolvin and Jordan (2008)). This reason becomes 
more transparent as firms need to issues higher number of shares in the period of 2001-2004 to get 
planned proceeds due to the reversal in valuations. 
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V. Empirical results 
5.1. Public float and cash holdings 
5.1.1. Effects of public float on cash holdings 
 Table V reports the cash holdings (Cash/sale) in the different public float ranges for various 
holding periods. Cash holdings is calculated at the end of fiscal years using annual data from 
Compustat. Columns (1) through (8) report the mean and t-stat of cash holdings by each range at the 
end of fiscal IPO and after firm goes public one, two, and three years. I first sort the IPO sample into 
five public float ranges: 0–20%, 20–40%, 40–60%, 60–80%, and 80–100% for each range. I then 
measure the cash holdings for IPO year, and one, two, three years after that. To control for outliers, 
cash holdings are winsorized at 1%. 
In Table V, cash holdings are reported as a function of the percentage of the public float for 
different horizons. The general picture that evolves for the cash holdings for all horizons is that the 
cash holdings always negatively relate to public float. Moreover, when firms publish more shares, or 
when public float range move from lower range to higher range, mean of cash holdings reduces more 
sharply. All cash holdings are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  
Table VI, VII, VIII examine the relation of public float to cash holdings. I use log of cash to sales 
ratio as proxy for cash holdings in table VI, and log of ratio of cash and marketable securities to net 
assets as proxy for cash holdings in table VII. Due to high skewness in industry-adjusted cash to sales 
ratio, I still apply log for this ratio as proxy for cash holdings in table VIII. Therefore, the sample for 
test in table VIII is limited to only 9557 firm-year observations with firms having cash holdings larger 
than average level of their industry. The data set for test in table VI and VII includes 15,672 firm-year 
observations from 4394 firms going public in the period from 1990 to 2013. The independent 
variables include public float (PF) and firm control variables as described in detail in Appendix 2, 
Dividend indicator, and Bond indicator. Net assets equal total assets minus cash holdings. All 
variables except for dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% level on either tail. 
For the test of each proxy of cash holdings, I ran five regressions specified as follows. In 
regression (1), the only independent variable is public float (PF). Regression results from column (1) 
of all three tables show the same result that public float has significantly negative relation with firm’s 
cash holdings. In average, if public float increases 1%, cash holdings will decrease about 2.63%. In 
regression (2) through regression (5) of all three tables, I include all other control variables. 
Additionally, I applied firm fixed effects for regression (3) to control for possibility of time variance 
of unobservable factors that might affect simultaneously the public float and cash holdings. Standard 
deviation clustered by firm is applied in regression (4) to control for the correlation of the residuals 
within a firm across years in the sample. Standard deviation clustered by time is applied in regression 
(5) to control for the correlation of the residuals in a given year across different firms. All regressions 
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Table V: Cash holdings (log) of IPO firms sorted by public float 
This table reports the average cash holdings measured by ratio of cash to sales in the different public float ranges for various holding periods. Cash holdings are calculated 
at the end of IPO fiscal year, and at the end of first, second, and third fiscal year after IPO year. The complete sample consists of 4394 firms at the end of IPO fiscal year; 
4149 firms at the end of first fiscal year after IPO; 3761 firms at the end of second fiscal year after IPO; and 3368 firms at the end of third fiscal year after IPO with total 
15672 firm-years obs. Firstly, the IPO sample is sorted into 5 public float ranges: 0-20%, 20-40%, 40-60%, 60-80%, and 80-100% for each range. I then measure the cash 
holdings for IPO year, first, second, and third year after IPO. For each horizon, the mean cash holdings and the t-statistic of the mean cash holdings are reported. I 
winsorize cash holdings at 1% to control for outlier.  
 
Public float 
range (%) 
Year of IPO  1st year after IPO  2nd year after IPO  3rd year after IPO 
 
N 
(1) 
Mean 
(2) 
t Stat 
  
N 
(3) 
Mean 
(4) 
t Stat 
  
N 
(5) 
Mean 
(6) 
t Stat 
  
N 
(7) 
Mean 
(8) 
t Stat 
0-20 896 -0.86 -12.69  830 -1.37 -21.81  758 -1.53 -23.38  664 -1.62 -24.04 
20-40 2503 -1.42 -29.62  2374 -1.85 -40.11  2144 -2.05 -43.28  1924 -2.19 -45.12 
40-60 654 -2.61 -28.28  617 -2.91 -32.93  567 -3.08 -34.99  500 -3.11 -34.92 
60-80 105 -2.65 -13.10  100 -2.85 -13.85  87 -3.21 -15.67  76 -3.47 -14.61 
80-100 252 -2.54 -18.70  243 -2.92 -24.74  223 -2.87 -23.07  202 -2.92 -23.46 
Total 4394  4149      3761    3368   
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Table VI: Cash holdings (Log_Cash/Sales) – regression results 
The sample consists of 15,672 firm-year observations from 4,395 domestic IPO firms going public in the period 
from 1990 to 2013. The table presents panel regression coefficients from  
Log_Cash/Salesi,t =  β0  +  β1 x Public Float i +  β x Control variables i,t +  i,t, 
in which log of cash to sales ratio is proxy for firm’s cash holdings. Main independent variable is public float. 
Control variables include firm size, firm leverage, ratio of the market value to book value of assets (Market-to-
Book), ratio of cash flow to net assets (Cash Flow/Assets), ratio of net working capital to net assets (Working 
Capital/Assets), ratio of research and development to sales (R&D/Sales), ratio of capital expenditures to net 
assets (CapEx/Assets), ratio of acquisition to sales (Acquisition/Sales), Dividend indicator, and Bond indicator. 
Net assets equal total assets minus cash holdings. The variables Cash Holdings, Leverage, Market-to-Book, 
CF/Assets, Working Capital/Assets, R&D/Sales, CapEx/Assets, Acquisition/Sales are winsorized at the 1% 
level on either tail. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient. Adjusted R2 and the sample 
size for each regression are reported in the last rows of the table. 
Y: Log_Cash/Sale (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -1.0966 -2.0719 -1.9887 -2.0664 -2.0719 
 (-33.16) (-25.93) (-4.28) (-3.89) (-11.76) 
PF -2.6330 -1.5292 -0.9413 -1.5307 -1.5291614 
 (-30.71) (-18.75) (-13.07) (-6.39) (-12.88) 
Size  -0.0388 0.0005 -0.0392 -0.0388 
  (-3.07) (0.05) (-0.69) (-1.34) 
Leverage  -1.0011 -0.8722 -0.9995 -1.0011 
  (-14.44) (-17.27) (-4.40) (-8.90) 
Market-to-Book  0.1055 0.0628 0.1052 0.1055 
  (19.04) (12.34) (5.24) (7.45) 
Cash Flow/Assets  -0.1330 -0.0703 -0.1324 -0.1330 
  (-5.49) (-4.68) (-2.85) (-3.99) 
Working Capital/Assets  0.4977 0.4374 0.4973 0.4977 
  (22.67) (39.04) (7.07) (13.17) 
R&D/Sales  0.1051 0.0844 0.1051 0.1051 
  (28.74) (35.17) (21.73) (45.36) 
CapEx/Assets  1.4945 2.0021 1.4845 1.4945 
  (9.18) (14.08) (2.11) (4.15) 
Acquisition/Sales  0.9249 0.5858 0.9219 0.9249 
  (13.68) (9.42) (4.78) (7.76) 
Dividend Indicator  -0.6619 -0.2909 -0.6610 -0.6619 
  (-14.02) (-6.25) (-3.91) (-7.89) 
Bond Indicator  -0.0842 -0.0763 -0.0848 -0.0842 
  (-2.87) (-2.86) (-0.92) (-2.03) 
Adj R2 0.0549 0.4004 0.5273 0.4002 0.4004 
N 15107 13869 13842 13842 13869 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No 
S.D. clustered by industry No No No Yes No 
S.D. clustered by time No No No No Yes 
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Table VII: Cash holdings (Log_Cash/Assets) – regression results 
The sample consists of 15,672 firm-year observations from 4,395 domestic IPO firms going public in the period 
from 1990 to 2013. The table presents panel regression coefficients from  
Log_Cash/Assets i,t =  β0  +  β1 x Public Float i +  β x Control variables i,t +  i,t, 
in which log of cash to assets ratio is proxy for firm’s cash holdings. Main independent variable is public float. 
Control variables include firm size, firm leverage, ratio of the market value to book value of assets (Market-to-
Book), ratio of cash flow to net assets (Cash Flow/Assets), ratio of net working capital to net assets (Working 
Capital/Assets), ratio of research and development to sales (R&D/Sales), ratio of capital expenditures to net 
assets (CapEx/Assets), ratio of acquisition to sales (Acquisition/Sales), Dividend indicator, and Bond indicator. 
Net assets equal total assets minus cash holdings. The variables Cash Holdings, Leverage, Market-to-Book, 
CF/Assets, Working Capital/Assets, R&D/Sales, CapEx/Assets, Acquisition/Sales are winsorized at the 1% 
level on either tail. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient. Adjusted R2 and the sample 
size for each regression are reported in the last rows of the table. 
Y: Log_Cash/Assets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -1.31549 -1.7950 -1.7900 -1.7900 -1.7950 
 (-45.37) (-26.22) (-31.23) (-4.84) (-10.78) 
PF -2.31343 -1.1633 -1.1649 -1.1649 -1.1633 
 (-29.74) (-16.66) (-17.99) (-8.08) (-12.90) 
Size  -0.1329 -0.1335 -0.1335 -0.1329 
  (-12.81) (-13.81) (-3.62) (-7.00) 
Leverage  -0.9516 -0.9506 -0.9506 -0.9516 
  (-15.66) (-20.84) (-6.05) (-11.89) 
Market-to-Book  0.0958 0.0955 0.0955 0.0958 
  (19.74) (20.52) (4.74) (5.10) 
Cash Flow/Assets  -0.0576 -0.0569 -0.0569 -0.0576 
  (-3.16) (-4.14) (-1.75) (-1.61) 
Working Capital/Assets  0.6317 0.6321 0.6321 0.6317 
  (28.06) (61.44) (7.82) (16.54) 
R&D/Sales  0.0053 0.0052 0.0052 0.0053 
  (2.27) (2.47) (0.75) (2.28) 
CapEx/Assets  0.8808 0.8783 0.8783 0.8807 
  (6.68) (7.36) (1.56) (3.10) 
Acquisition/Sales  -0.0252 -0.0271 -0.0271 -0.0252 
  (-0.46) (-0.48) (-0.32) (-0.29) 
Dividend Indicator  -0.2736 -0.2722 -0.2722 -0.2736 
  (-6.36) (-6.47) (-2.60) (-4.99) 
Bond Indicator  -0.0725 -0.0717 -0.0717 -0.0725 
  (-2.97) (-2.92) (-1.10) (-1.73) 
Adj R2 0.0554 0.4282 0.428503 0.4282 0.4282 
N 15439 13873 13846 13846 13873 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No 
S.D. clustered by industry No No No Yes No 
S.D. clustered by time No No No No Yes 
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Table VIII: Cash holdings (Industries adjusted Cash/Sales) – regression results 
The sample consists of 15,672 firm-year observations from 4,395 domestic IPO firms going public in the period 
from 1990 to 2013. The table presents panel regression coefficients from  
Industries Adjusted Cash/Sales i,t =  β0  +  β1 x Public Float i +  β x Control variables i,t +  i,t, 
in which industries adjusted cash to sales ratio is proxy for firm’s cash holdings. Main independent variable is 
public float. Control variables include firm size, firm leverage, ratio of the market value to book value of assets 
(Market-to-Book), ratio of cash flow to net assets (Cash Flow/Assets), ratio of net working capital to net assets 
(Working Capital/Assets), ratio of research and development to sales (R&D/Sales), ratio of capital expenditures 
to net assets (CapEx/Assets), ratio of acquisition to sales (Acquisition/Sales), Dividend indicator, and Bond 
indicator. Net assets equal total assets minus cash holdings. The variables Cash Holdings, Leverage, Market-to-
Book, CF/Assets, Working Capital/Assets, R&D/Sales, CapEx/Assets, Acquisition/Sales are winsorized at the 1% 
level on either tail. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient. Adjusted R2 and the sample 
size for each regression are reported in the last rows of the table. 
Y: CashSale_Adj (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -0.83739 -1.6332 -1.6332 -1.6332 -1.6332 
 (-21.37) (-3.56) (-19.87) (-3.56) (-12.88) 
PF -1.89512 -1.1278 -1.1278 -1.1278 -1.1281 
 (-17.94) (-5.65) (-11.55) (-5.65) (-6.95) 
Size  -0.0744 -0.0744 -0.0744 -0.0752 
  (-1.27) (-5.24) (-1.27) (-1.95) 
Leverage  -0.2066 -0.2066 -0.2066 -0.2094 
  (-0.98) (-3.14) (-0.98) (-1.82) 
Market-to-Book  0.0538 0.0538 0.0538 0.0538 
  (6.69) (9.10) (6.69) (3.84) 
Cash Flow/Assets  -0.0750 -0.0750 -0.0750 -0.0753 
  (-1.60) (-4.19) (-1.60) (-2.36) 
Working Capital/Assets  0.4090 0.4090 0.4090 0.4095 
  (7.07) (32.92) (7.07) (12.22) 
R&D/Sales  0.1017 0.1017 0.1017 0.1017 
  (29.86) (41.45) (29.86) (49.68) 
CapEx/Assets  1.3062 1.3062 1.3062 1.3187 
  (2.35) (8.13) (2.35) (5.70) 
Acquisition/Sales  0.8390 0.8390 0.8390 0.8440 
  (4.66) (10.78) (4.66) (6.35) 
Dividend Indicator  -0.9820 -0.9820 -0.9820 -0.9769 
  (-5.50) (-14.63) (-5.50) (-10.90) 
Bond Indicator  -0.0740 -0.0740 -0.0740 -0.0698 
  (-0.83) (-2.10) (-0.83) (-1.66) 
Adj R2 0.0283 0.3972 0.3972 0.3972 0.3974 
N 9557 8828 8828 8828 8840 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No 
S.D. clustered by industry No No No Yes No 
S.D. clustered by time No No No No Yes 
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in table VI, VII and VIII show the same results that cash holdings have negative relation with public 
float and some control variables including firm size, leverage, cash holdings/assets, dividend payout, 
and bond indicator. On the other hand, cash holdings is positively related to market to book value, 
working capital/assets, R&D/sales, CapEx/Sales, and Acquisition/Sales. 
5.1.2. Differences in uses of cash holdings 
To check the determinants leading to the differences in cash uses between firms with high public 
float and firms with low float, I check how firms make their investment and payout policy in relation 
with public float. Specifically, I check how excess cash, public float, and their interaction are related 
to firm’s investment decisions and payout policy. I focus on two internal investment decisions 
including capital expenditure and R&D expenditures and one external investment decisions, 
acquisitions. According to Gompers, Ishii, and Metrik (2003), firms have tendency in recent years to 
go public to raise money to finance their daily capital expenditure, but an overused amount of cash on 
this area is treated as sign of weak corporate governance. On the other hand, overusing excess cash in 
R&D expenditure increases firm value (Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique, 2004), especially when 
firms go public with a high float seeking funds for their hot development. Acquisitions is also one of 
the main decisions weak governed firms make when they hold a high insignificant cash amount. Such 
acquisitions further tend to have value-destroying (Harford, 1999; Masulin, Wang, and Xie, 2007). 
Moreover, J.Harford et al. (2008) show that firm’s decision of payout using excess cash depends 
on its governance. Strong governed firms are more likely to pay more dividends committing their 
payout policy in the long term. However, firms with weak governance choose repurchase to not bear 
payout commitment in the future. 
Capital expenditure is adjusted annually by the industry median value using all firms having 
information available in Compustat during my testing period. The industries are classified into 48 
industry level same as in previous section. However, due to the nature of newly public firms, I 
couldn’t construct industry-adjusted variables for R&D expenditure and Repurchases. With 15,672 
observations in the sample, nearly 365 observations have missing value for R&D expenditure; about 
7000 observations don’t spend money for R&D; only 8300 observations invest in R&D expenditures. 
Similarly, there are nearly 920 observations missing value for acquisitions in my sample, about 
10,000 observations with negative or non-outflow in acquisition, only 5254 observations spending 
money on this area. Therefore, I construct dummy variables for R&D expenditure and Acquisition in 
which the values equal to 0 if firm doesn’t use money for these two activities and 1 otherwise. 
Moreover, there are 14,134 observations with non-cash payout and only 5254 observations with 
positive payout flow to shareholders. Only about 1630 observations have data for repurchase in which 
half of them does not carry repurchase within 3 years after IPO. Thus, I also construct dummy 
variables for these two proxies of payout policy with 0 for non-payout or repurchase and 1 otherwise. 
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Table IX: Public float and cash holdings in relation with firms’ investment and payout decisions 
This table shows the effects of cash holdings in relation with public float on firm’s investment decisions and 
payout policy. The investment decisions include industry-adjusted capital expenditure, dummy variables for 
R&D and Acquisitions. Capital expenditure is adjusted yearly based on 48 Fama-French 48 industry 
classification system. Payout policy consists of dummy variables for dividend payout and repurchases. All 
dummy variables equals to 0 if main numeric variables have value of 0 and otherwise. The main explanatory 
variables are lagged cash residual, change in lagged cash residual, public float and interaction between public 
float and lagged cash residuals. Cash residual is residual from a regression of cash holdings on firm-specific 
characteristics including firm size, leverage, sales, cash flow, ratio of working capital to assets, R&D to sales, 
capital expenditures to assets, and acquisition to sales as well as industry and year indicator variables. 
Additional control variables include lagged sales growth, lagged net working capital, lagged leverage, and 
lagged firm size. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient. Adjusted R2 and the sample 
size for each regression are reported in the last rows of the table. 
 Investment Decisions  Payout policy 
 
Ind. Adjusted 
Capital Exp. 
(1) 
R&D 
Dummy 
(2) 
Acquisitions 
Dummy 
(3) 
 
Dividends 
Dummy 
(4) 
Repurchases 
Dummy 
(5) 
Cash residual(t-1) 0.0012 10.2268 -0.0121  0.0028 0.0113 
 
(1.99) (0.99) (-2.62)  (3.12) (1.85) 
Change in cash 
residual(t-1) 
0.0001 10.7515 -0.0106  0.0020 0.0116 
 
(0.22) (0.99) (-2.67)  (2.41) (2.49) 
Public Float -0.0199 -18.8839 0.0649  0.1330 -0.1041 
 
(-3.98) (-1.12) (2.09)  (6.29) (-1.36) 
Public Float * 
Cash residual(t-1) 
0.0001 1.9373 0.0017  -0.0001 0.0000 
 
(1.00) (1.10) (0.93)  (-2.70) (-0.02) 
Sale(t-1) 0.0000 -0.0042 0.0000  0.0001 0.0000 
 
(-5.64) (-0.97) (-4.47)  (7.83) (1.04) 
Working capital(t-1) 0.0033 3.5934 -0.0011  -0.0094 -0.0246 
 
(3.14) (1.29) (-0.25)  (-7.64) (-1.91) 
Leverage(t-1) 0.0025 10.4254 0.0348  -0.0155 -0.1187 
 
(0.49) (1.14) (1.33)  (-1.30) (-2.82) 
Size(t-1) 0.0022 -0.0555 0.0263  0.0236 0.0912 
 
(1.75) (-0.05) (3.85)  (6.11) (5.85) 
Intercept 0.0050 16.3759 -0.0921  -0.0888 0.0904 
 
(0.68) (1.24) (-2.71)  (-4.87) (1.07) 
Observations 9714 9714 9714  9711 1186 
R-Square 0.0117 0.0288 0.0179  0.1026 0.0994 
S.D. clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
S.D. clustered by time Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 
To examine the effect of firm’s cash holdings on investment decisions, I use Cash position defined 
as the difference between firm’s actual cash holdings and its expected value, so-called unexplained 
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portion of cash holdings following the method of J. Harford et al. (2008). The unexplained cash is 
measured by the residual from a regression of cash holdings on firm size, leverage, market to book 
value as market options, cash flow as profitability, ratios of working capital to assets, R&D to sales, 
Capital expenditures to assets, and acquisition to sales as well as industry and year indicator variables. 
Finally, main control variables include lagged cash residual, change in lagged cash residual, public 
float, interaction of public float and lagged cash residual. Other control variables include lagged sale, 
lagged working capital, lagged leverage, and lagged size following Comment and Schwert (1995). He 
used additional market model residual and average price-earnings ratio, as well as averaged values 
over the prior four years for sale, working capital, leverage, and size to examine the probability of 
acquisition activity. However, due to lack of information from IPO, I use four control variables with 
their lagged values. The results are shown in table IX. 
The table shows that when firm have more cash than their need for usual activities, they will 
increase their spending on capital expenditure and payout, but decrease expenses for acquisitions. 
Firms with high public float will use less money on capital expenditure, instead of that they use more 
money on implement acquisition. Interestingly, firms going public with high float do not use their 
excess cash on development. All interactions between public float and cash residual are positive 
suggesting that firms with high public float increase investments in R&D relative to their peers as 
their cash residuals increase. However, these coefficients of interactions are insignificant. 
Firms with high public float are also more like to pay dividend instead of repurchase. However, the 
interaction of public float with the cash residuals of the firms is negative and significant, which 
suggests that firms with high public float are less likely to pay out dividend  as their cash positions 
increases.  
5.1.3. Public float, excess cash, and profitability 
Table IX shows how investment and payout decisions differ based on public float and the firm’s 
excess cash. While these relations are instructive, it is hard to see their effects on shareholder wealth. 
Therefore, I continue to test the impact of these relations on firm performance. I check whether the 
difference in investment and payout decisions harm performance. Thus, I examine whether public 
float in relation with excess cash are related to future changes in firms’ performance. 
Specifically, I use industry-adjusted profitability and industry-adjusted market to book (calculated 
similar to industry-adjusted capital expenditures) as proxies for firm performance. I found that cash 
positions do not increase firm performance by themselves. For the public float, I find that the public 
float is significantly related to market valuation as the firms issue more shares as firms with higher 
public float have a significantly higher market to book ratio than those with lower public float. I also   
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Table X: Public float and cash holdings in relation with firms’ profitability and market-to-book 
This table provides regression results on whether the public float is related to changes in firms’ profitability and 
market-to-book relative to industry peers. I include firms’ lagged profitability or market-to-book in the models 
to control for endogeneity concerns. The dependent variable in models 1 and 2 are industry-adjusted 
profitability and industry-adjusted market-to-book, respectively. All the dependent variables are industry-
adjusted on a yearly basis using the Fama-French 48 industry classification system. The main explanatory 
variables are lagged cash residual, change in lagged cash residual, public float and interaction between public 
float and lagged cash residuals. Cash residual is residual from a regression of cash holdings on firm-specific 
characteristics including firm size, leverage, sales, cash flow, ratio of working capital to assets, R&D to sales, 
capital expenditures to assets, and acquisition to sales as well as industry and year indicator variables. 
Additional control variables include lagged sales growth, lagged net working capital, lagged leverage, and 
lagged firm size. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient. Adjusted R2 and the sample 
size for each regression are reported in the last rows of the table. 
 
Industry-adjusted 
Profitability 
(1) 
Industry-adjusted  
MtB 
(2) 
Industry-adjusted profitability (1) 
or MtB (2)(t-1) 
0.3814 0.4346 
 (5.89) (4.67) 
Cash residual(t-1) -0.0157 -0.0188 
 (-1.50) (-0.80) 
Change in cash residual(t-1) -0.0099 -0.0161 
 (-1.07) (-0.88) 
Public Float -0.0727 1.2559 
 (-1.27) (3.81) 
Public Float * 
Cash residual(t-1) 
0.0001 0.0062 
 (0.04) (2.75) 
Sale(t-1) 0.0000 0.0003 
 (-1.47) (3.71) 
Working capital(t-1) 0.0643 -0.1955 
 (4.08) (-2.75) 
Leverage(t-1) -0.1151 0.7947 
 (-1.24) (5.37) 
Size(t-1) 0.0990 -0.4872 
 (3.25) (-4.85) 
Intercept -0.1957 0.1590 
 (-1.86) (0.39) 
Observations 9713 9707 
R-Square 0.3092 0.3899 
S.D. clustered by firm Yes Yes 
S.D. clustered by time Yes Yes 
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find the interaction of public float and lagged cash residuals is significantly positive, meaning that 
firms with high public float increase their market value as their cash positions increases. However, the 
result does not hold for profitability, suggesting that the increase in market valuation when public 
float increases comes from the pressure and monitoring of outside investors. 
5.2. Public float and corporate governance 
5.2.1. Effect of public float on firm’s corporate governance  
 To examine the reason why public float impacts on cash holding, I test the relation between 
public float and corporate governance of IPO firms. I employ a method of Yael V.Hochberg (2012) to 
use discretional current accruals as dependent variables. Main explainable variable is public float. 
Control variables are selected based on regression model of Al-Fayoumi, Nedal, Bana Abuzayed, and 
David Alexander (2010), including one-year lag of firm size, lag of ROE, lag of growth rate, and lag 
of leverage. Firm size is included to test whether large firms are less (more) likely to engage in 
earnings management to smooth income (Ashari et al. (1994)), or to avoid their political visibility 
(Moses (1987)). Firm size equals to log of total assets. Accruals could also relate to growth 
opportunity. It is expected that firms are more likely to manage earnings in high growth phase (Healy 
and Palepu (2003)). Therefore, I include growth rate, measured by change of sale year by year, as a 
control variable into the model to control for demand as well as product-cycle effects on profitability. 
Return on equity (ROE) stands for profitability. The more firm manage its earning, the less ROE it 
gains. I expect a negative relation between profitability and dependent variable. Finally, firm financial 
leverage is used to be a proxy for risk that firm will manage its earning more aggressive when it face 
default on debt covenants (Press and Weintrop (1990)). Leverage is computed by dividing debt to 
assets. 
In regression (1), only public float (PF) is included in model as independent variable. In regression 
(2) through regression (4) of all three tables, I include all other control variables. Moreover, I applied 
firm fixed effects for regression (3), standard deviation clustered by firm in regression (4), standard 
deviation clustered by time in regression (5). As shown in all 5 regressions in the table, public float 
has positive relation with discretional current accruals. This means that when insiders’ ownership 
decreases more and more, insiders tend to adjust discretional current accrual upward, signaling for 
weak corporate governance. 
5.2.2. Effect of public float on firm cash holdings in correlation with corporate governance  
Table X shows results of the regression examining the effect of public float on firm cash holdings 
in association with corporate governance. In all three regressions, log of cash to sales ratio is 
employed as dependent variable to stand for firm cash holdings. In column (1), I show the effect of 
public float on cash holdings again to compare with its effect on cash holdings after interacting with 
corporate governance proxy in column (3). In column (2), I run regression with key independent   
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Table XI: Discretional current accruals and public float – regression results 
This table describes regression analysis results on the relation between the discretional current accrual and the 
public float, controlling for various performance variables and firm characteristics. The dependent variable is 
discretional current accruals, measured within 3 years after IPO, following a method of Jones (1991) described 
in Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998). The main explanatory variable is public float (PF). Control variables are 
taken from annual Compustat database, including following variables. SIZE_1 is the size of the firm measured 
by the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year immediately before IPO year. ROE_1 is return on 
equity of firm at the end of fiscal year immediately before IPO year. GROWTH_1 is the growth of the company 
calculated by percentage of change in sales before IPO year. LEV_1 is the leverage ratio calculated by total 
liabilities over total assets at the end of fiscal year immediately before IPO year. To control for outliers, 
dependent variable and all independent variables are winsorized at 1%. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient. Adjusted R2 and the sample size for each regression are reported in the last 
rows of the table. 
Y: DCA in IPO year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.0055 0.0186 0.0107 0.0107 0.0108 
 
(0.88) (1.25) (0.99) (0.54) (0.51) 
PF 0.0436 0.0395 0.0492 0.0492 0.0492 
 
(2.79) (2.68) (3.17) (3.85) (2.81) 
SIZE_1  -0.0069 -0.0062 -0.0062 -0.0062 
 
 (-2.30) (-3.00) (-1.73) (-1.66) 
ROE_1  0.0031 0.0024 0.0024 0.0025 
 
 (1.14) (1.71) (1.09) (0.80) 
GROWTH_1  0.0303 0.0408 0.0408 0.0409 
 
 (2.59) (11.46) (2.92) (3.01) 
LEV_1  0.0174 0.0202 0.0202 0.0201 
 
 (0.96) (1.65) (1.05) (1.00) 
Adj R2 0.0005 0.0127 0.0129 0.0130 0.0130 
N 14702 14672 14648 14648 14672 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes No No 
S.D. clustered by firm No No No Yes No 
S.D. clustered by time No No No No Yes 
 
variable is discretional current accruals to examine whether this variable has direct effect on cash 
holdings or not. In column (3), I include both public float and discretional current accruals together 
with the interaction term of these two variables to examine the effect of public float on firm cash 
holdings in association with corporate governance. 
Results show that both public float and discretional current accruals have separate effects on cash 
holdings as shown in column (1) and (2). However, the coefficient of interaction term in column (3) is 
negative which means that an increase in discretional current accruals causes higher decrease in firm 
cash holdings for large public float. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant. I suggest   
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Table XII: Cash holdings (Log_Cash/Sales) and  Public float with differing corporate 
governance – regression results 
The sample consists of 15,672 firm-year observations from 4,395 domestic IPO firms going public in the period 
from 1990 to 2013. The table presents panel regression coefficients from  
Log_Cash/Sales i,t =  β0  +  β1 x Public Float i + β2 x DCA i,t + β3 x Public Float i x DCA i,t +  β x Control 
variables i,t + i,t, 
in which log of cash to sales ratio is proxy for firm’s cash holdings. Main independent variable is public float. 
Discretional current accruals is proxy for corporate governance, measured within 3 years after IPO, following a 
method of Jones (1991) described in Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998). Public Float  x DCA is interaction term. 
Control variables include firm size, firm leverage, ratio of the market value to book value of assets (Market-to-
Book), ratio of cash flow to net assets (Cash Flow/Assets), ratio of net working capital to net assets (Working 
Capital/Assets), ratio of research and development to sales (R&D/Sales), ratio of capital expenditures to net 
assets (CapEx/Assets), ratio of acquisition to sales (Acquisition/Sales), Dividend indicator, and Bond indicator. 
Net assets equal total assets minus cash holdings. The variables Cash Holdings, Leverage, Market-to-Book, 
CF/Assets, Working Capital/Assets, R&D/Sales, CapEx/Assets, Acquisition/Sales are winsorized at the 1% 
level on either tail. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient. Adjusted R2 and the sample 
size for each regression are reported in the last rows of the table. 
Y: Log_Cash/Sales (1) (2) (3)  
Intercept -2.0719 -2.5919 -2.0662 -2.0588 
 (-25.93) (-33.84) (-29.12) (-12.03) 
PF -1.5292  -1.5093 -1.5141 
 (-18.75)  (-18.75) (-11.30) 
DCA  -0.2247  -0.1448 
  (-4.56)  (-1.61) 
PF*DCA   -0.5278 -0.2056 
   (-4.62) (-0.86) 
Size -0.0388 -0.0356 -0.0387 -0.0397 
 (-3.07) (-2.69) (-3.22) (-1.54) 
Leverage -1.0011 -1.1394 -1.007 -1.0054 
 (-14.44) (-15.56) (-17.93) (-8.57) 
Market-to-Book 0.1055 0.1197 0.1049 0.1049 
 (19.04) (20.89) (18.44) (9.89) 
Cash Flow/Assets -0.1330 -0.1646 -0.1422 -0.1415 
 (-5.49) (-6.23) (-8.32) (-4.36) 
Working Capital/Assets 0.4977 0.4964 0.4921 0.4920 
 (22.67) (21.02) (38.77) (14.11) 
R&D/Sales 0.1051 0.1061 0.1052 0.1051 
 (28.74) (26.79) (40.00) (28.59) 
CapEx/Assets 1.4945 1.4543 1.4289 1.4219 
 (9.18) (8.65) (9.60) (4.92) 
Acquisition/Sales 0.9249 0.8704 0.9468 0.9467 
 (13.68) (11.57) (13.12) (8.94) 
Dividend Indicator -0.6619 -0.8050 -0.6883 -0.6857 
 (-14.02) (-16.92) (-13.11) (-9.64) 
Bond Indicator -0.0842 -0.0844 -0.0713 -0.0719 
 (-2.87) (-2.78) (-2.36) (-1.77) 
Adj R2 0.4004 0.3815 0.3981 0.3983 
N 13869 13301 13277 13277 
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Table XIII: Cash holdings (Log_Cash/Assets) – regression result for sample without delisted 
firms 
The sample consists of 15,304 firm-year observations from 4,393 domestic IPO firms going public in the period 
from 1990 to 2013, and active within 3 years after IPO. The table presents panel regression coefficients from in 
which log of cash to assets ratio is proxy for firm’s cash holdings. Main independent variable is public float. 
Control variables include firm size, firm leverage, ratio of the market value to book value of assets (Market-to-
Book), ratio of cash flow to net assets (Cash Flow/Assets), ratio of net working capital to net assets (Working 
Capital/Assets), ratio of research and development to sales (R&D/Sales), ratio of capital expenditures to net 
assets (CapEx/Assets), ratio of acquisition to sales (Acquisition/Sales), Dividend indicator, and Bond indicator. 
Net assets equal total assets minus cash holdings. The variables Cash Holdings, Leverage, Market-to-Book, 
CF/Assets, Working Capital/Assets, R&D/Sales, CapEx/Assets, Acquisition/Sales are winsorized at the 1% 
level on either tail. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient. Adjusted R2 and the sample 
size for each regression are reported in the last rows of the table. 
Y: Log_Cash/Assets (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -1.0727 -2.0416 -2.0358 -2.0358 
 (-31.91) (-24.69) (-28.87) (-11.79) 
PF -2.69369 -1.5544 -1.5560 -1.5560 
 (-30.71) (-18.61) (-19.68) (-12.40) 
Size  -0.0435 -0.0439 -0.0439 
  (-3.31) (-3.68) (-1.72) 
Leverage  -1.0229 -1.0210 -1.0210 
  (-13.88) (-17.86) (-8.23) 
Market-to-Book  0.1044 0.1041 0.1041 
  (18.57) (18.46) (9.85) 
Cash Flow/Assets  -0.1683 -0.1676 -0.1676 
  (-6.16) (-9.23) (-4.65) 
Working Capital/Assets  0.4941 0.4937 0.4937 
  (21.91) (38.93) (14.36) 
R&D/Sales  0.1030 0.1030 0.1030 
  (27.90) (39.80) (28.68) 
CapEx/Assets  1.5259 1.5159 1.5159 
  (9.38) (10.50) (5.29) 
Acquisition/Sales  0.9359 0.9328 0.9328 
  (13.72) (13.54) (9.91) 
Dividend Indicator  -0.6546 -0.6538 -0.6538 
  (-13.78) (-12.87) (-9.31) 
Bond Indicator  -0.0818 -0.0823 -0.0823 
  (-2.77) (-2.77) (-2.17) 
Adj R2 0.0567 0.4033 0.403077 0.4031 
N 14779 13582 13555 13555 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No 
S.D. clustered by industry No No No Yes 
S.D. clustered by time No No No Yes 
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there exists an endogenous effect between discretional current accruals and firm cash holdings which 
impacts to the statistics significance of the coefficient of the interaction term. I suggest that further 
tests should be implemented to treat this issue. 
5.3. Robustness tests 
 To check whether the relation between cash holdings and public float still holds in case of delisted 
firms, I exclude observations with firms delisted in that year and after that. The new sample without 
delisted observations consists of 15,304 firm year observations from 4,393 firms. The results of the 
test still remain and are shown in table XIII. 
VI. Conclusion 
 In this study, I investigate the relation between the public float and firm cash holdings after IPO 
using a sample of 4394 IPOs between 1990 and 2013. I find that public float has very significant 
negative relation with firm cash holdings. I conjecture that decrease in ownership as firm publish 
more shares motivates insiders to use firm cash holdings more aggressive, resulting in lower level of 
cash holdings in higher public float firm after IPO.  
 I find that public float truly negatively affects corporate governance. Outsider shareholders seem 
to play unsubstantial role in scrutiny of corporate activities. A clear evidence is that insiders try to 
manage earnings upwardly by adjusting discretional current accrual. However, effect of public float 
on cash holdings in relation of corporate governance is hard to confirm and still require further tests. 
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